Harvard University scholar Graham Allison talks about his new book on US-China relations.

Having achieved the status quo ante, one can well imagine the boffins at Cambridge congratulating themselves.

China's leaders would very reluctantly back down if they were truly convinced that the alternative was war with America. But how would the US convince them of that?

The film reflects the increasingly widespread view in China that it has thrown off the shackles of a century of humiliation and emerged as a power equal to - if not better than - its Western counterparts.

A growing political-military nexus between China and Pakistan, as currently seems likely, will further aggravate security competition with India.

Kong Xuanyou will have to have a thick skin because he is dealing with some of the world’s most prodigiously talented producers of invective.

Reports that Thailand, with Chinese money, is planning to build a new canal between the Pacific and Indian Oceans have set off a new wave of alarm bells over China’s plans to dominate the region.

The proclivity for extremism in Asia has spread beyond the ‘usual suspects’.

Young journalists are told professionalism is relative: no media are interest-free, and if you work for Chinese state media, you should represent the interest of the Chinese state.

Xi Jinping will soon announce his key slogan to take its place in the Chinese Communist Party charter alongside those of Mao, Deng, Jiang and Hu.

The US doesn’t have to be willing to blockade Scarborough Reef to stop China from building a military base there.

It looks as though the United States is going back to its position during negotiations on UNCLOS, and setting aside the carefully balanced nature of the EEZ regime.

A common assessment system for the Five Eyes allies would assist in safeguarding interlinked telecommunications and high-tech sectors.

For Beijing, armed drone exports are good business in more ways than one.

It is possible to both condemn China’s political system, but also accept it as an incipient great power with legitimate security concerns.

Beijing is not just trying to take control of an important body of water. It is trying to take control of East Asia and hopes to use the South China Sea dispute to do that.

The India-China standoff at the Doklam tri-junction area, now in its second month, is the most serious crisis between the two countries in 30 years.

Social media posts by Chinese people around the world suggest the idea that the West has some role in Liu Xiaobo’s downfall has traction.

Thailand’s deepening economic relations with China come at a time of acute political polarisation and instability for the country.

Early tensions over the China Solution cropped in a debate on the ‘Kindle­berger Trap’, a theme initiated by political scientist Joseph Nye.

The Chinese position is that its most valuable contribution to the global humanitarian good is the development and stability of China itself.

Xi’s itinerary during his three-day whirlwind visit to the city, his first as President, was packed with highly symbolic events showing Hong Kongers, and the world, who’s boss.

Hong Kong symbolises the Chinese Communist Party’s quest to consolidate legitimacy and power.

Australia could well change in fundamental ways if it moved to accommodate China’s growing power without regard to questions of value, integrity and public trust.

Much of what lies within ‘Chinese’ borders today was not so long ago a mosaic of very separate, very non-Chinese states.

These tragic events demonstrate a very unfortunate combination of a moral obligation system in which loyalty is due only to those closest to you, and a fundamental lack of trust.

China has tried to bypass regional strategic and ideological divides by both preserving its ties with Iran and getting closer to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel.

In general, given the way networks and contacts work in China, Party connections are not necessarily a cause for alarm.

China believes it is being deliberately misrepresented and victimised by an ‘arrogant’ US and its allies

China has gone from being a minor player in the polar regions to becoming a major actor in a little over 10 years.

America’s alliances are not much of an asset at all in managing relations with China. Indeed they are in many ways a net liability, because the benefits they offer are offset by the costs they impose.

The selection of Mischief Reef raises the question as to what particular freedom of navigation the US was seeking to exercise.

If India does not move to protect its equities, South Asia could soon fall under the sway of China's rapidly expanding maritime power.

In recent years China has demonstrated its ability to divide Europeans by creating new entities such as the 16+1 mechanism.

Australia can attempt to define its engagement with the initiative while it is still early days, or it can stick to playing by rules written by others.

The snub demonstrates Beijing now has another diplomatic tool in its arsenal.

The drama reflects one of China's truths: it relies on the moral compasses of Party bureaucrats to fight corruption rather than a robust legal system.

In China and beyond, BRI mobilises diverse agents to participate in trans-boundary and networked governance arrangements, indirectly seeding state transformation in other jurisdictions and territories.

Abrupt swings in policy direction in Asia are detracting from already diminished stocks of US trust and credibility.

Shen Zhihua’s remarks and the response on Weibo are just one aspect of a broader discussion over China’s posture towards the Korean Peninsula.

Blank reiterates the popular, but implausible, claim that Xi's determination to be strongest ruler in China since Mao is influenced by Putin.

The intensifying contest for the internet economy raises the prospect of US and Chinese tech titans carving the world into digital spheres of influence.

China’s online platforms are now distinct from their US-designed counterparts and in some respects more advanced.

Can Beijing act as a guarantor of regional security and stability? North Korea may provide the litmus test.

As long as China doesn't challenge the fundamental system of rule in Russia (as the US does), then it will remain a preferred partner if not an ally.

Western interests and norms are challenged less by the Sino-Russian partnership than by China and Russia acting individually.

Solving China's financial sector problems doesn't depend on the fickle global financial sector. Instead, China has to address some domestic issues.

Russia’s adaptation to the asymmetry in relations with China stands in stark contrast to its clash with the EU over Ukraine and Eastern Europe in general.

Any progress in terms of trade and investment flows will be incremental, and probably unaffected by politicians posturing.

Russian cooperation which builds Chinese military capabilities is more important and more detrimental to Western interests than any grand rhetoric coming out of officials’ mouths.